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Abstract 
We examine inconsistencies in preference orderings of the “more is less” kind (Alevy et al. 
2011) using the Contingent valuation (CV) and the Inferred valuation (IV) method (Lusk and 
Norwood 2009a, 2009b). We find that when moving in a familiar market for consumers (i.e., 
the food market) we only observe weak effects of inconsistencies. In addition, we find that 
the IV method is no better than the CV method in generating more consistent preference 
orderings. Surprisingly, we also find that the IV method generates higher valuations than CV, 
rendering one of its advantages of mitigating social desirability bias questionable. 
Key words:  willingness-to-pay (WTP), Contingent Valuation (CV), Inferred Valuation(IV), 
preference reversals 
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I. Introduction 
Eliciting people’s valuation for non-market goods has been central in the environmental 
economics literature. The Contingent Valuation method (CV) is by far the most popular 
valuation method and a big bulk of the literature deals with refinements that (attempt to) 
address a number of documented biases. Recently, in an article in this journal, Lusk and 
Norwood (2009a) developed a new method for addressing the so-called social desirability 
bias, that is, the utility that people derive from stating a value to please the researcher or 
themselves. Respondents, in CV studies may report socially desirable preferences, and thus 
misrepresent their “true” preferences, in order to either please the interviewer or to be 
consistent with social norms (Crowne and Marlowe 1960; Fisher 1993; Leggett et al. 2003; 
List et al. 2004; Plant et al. 2003). The respondent wishes to provide the answer that is most 
"socially acceptable" rather than speak his/her true feelings. Social desirability bias is 
intrinsic in CV studies. 
Lusk and Norwood (2009a, 2009b) thought that instead of asking people what they are 
willing to pay, to ask them what they think another (average) person would pay1. This simple 
twist in the wording of the valuation question generated (inferred) valuations that were close 
to real valuations (as compared to an experiment) and lower than hypothetical valuations 
(where social desirability is prevalent). They coined the term Inferred Valuation (IV) to 
describe this type of questioning in valuation studies. The aim of the IV method is not only to 
alleviate social desirability but also to moderate hypothetical bias.  
With the CV method people uncover preferences possibly including normative or 
moral considerations. On the contrary, with the IV method individuals are asked to predict 
how other people would behave and thus infer other’s people preferences that are ideally free 
                                                 
1 A similar concept was introduced in Cummings and Harrison’s (1992) “inference game”. 
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from normative or moral considerations. A natural question that follows is whether this 
prediction of preferences could result in more consistent and well defined preference 
orderings as compared to standard preference elicitation methods such as CV.  
The often cited strand of the literature that deals with non-consistent preference 
orderings is the preference reversal literature (see Seidl 2002 for a review). Broadly defined, 
any systematic change in preference orderings between normatively equivalent conditions 
can be called a preference-reversal (Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983). The preference reversals 
literature took off with the study of Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) and the help of 
economists (Grether and Plott 1979) that demonstrated the robustness of the effect. The 
phenomenon is an empirical regularity such that a pricing task for lotteries reveals opposite 
preferences from a choice task made out of the lotteries. 
More recently, List (2002) (as well as Alevy et al. (2011)) demonstrated a different 
type of preference reversals; those that occur between joint and isolated valuation modes (as 
opposed to different elicitation methods e.g., the pricing and choice task mentioned above). 
List (2002) showed that preferences in the sports card market follow a “more is less” pattern: 
while in a joint evaluation mode a superior bundle of sports cards is consistently valued more 
highly than an inferior bundle, in an isolated mode the inferior bundle is valued more than 
the superior bundle of cards. Reversals of preferences have also been observed for tasks that 
involve different evaluation scales (Bazerman et al. 1992;Goldstein and Einhorn 1987) as 
well as across evaluation modes (Hsee 1996;Irwin et al. 1993). 
Hsee (1996) (as well as Hsee et al. 1999) proposed the evaluability hypothesis as an 
explanation for preference reversals between valuation modes. He suggested that preference 
reversals between joint and separate evaluations occur because one of the attributes involved 
in the options is hard to evaluate independently and another attribute is relatively easy to 
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evaluate independently. When these attributes are presented jointly, evaluation is facilitated. 
In fact, Hsee (1996) showed that when both attributes are hard to evaluate or easy to 
evaluate, preference reversals disappear.  
The consequences of preference reversals are significant since they refute a basic 
assumption of the rational choice theory, that preferences are consistent and stable. In 
contrast, they back up a behavioral decision theory which states that preferences are 
constructed on the spot when asked to form a particular judgment or to make a specific 
decision (Johnson et al. 2005; Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006; Payne et al. 1999; Slovic 1995). 
In this sense values are not merely uncovered when elicited, they are partly constructed at 
that time which implies labile preferences.  
 We designed two market based surveys with experimental treatments that allow us to 
specifically test for valuation mode effects. As our valuation products, we chose private 
goods with environmental attributes that have specific quality dimensions that were signaled 
through appropriate forms of food labeling. Most qualitative attributes of food products can 
be considered as “credence” characteristics since their quality cannot be recognised before 
the purchase of food but also sometimes neither after their purchase (Caswell and Modjuzska 
1996;Darby and Karni 1973). In our experiments we use “organic” (BIO) as well as 
“protected designation of origin” (PDO) food products as our superior quality products. The 
two experiments vary the saliency of the inferior quality product. In experiment 1, the 
inferior quality food product is the conventional counterpart. In experiment 2 we make the 
distinction between the inferior and superior quality product more salient by introducing a 
much more inferior product than in experiment 1. In addition, since the products used in 
experiment 1 are sold by their weight, we introduced an additional product in experiment 2 
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that is sold by number of items. The purpose was to mimic List’s (2002)  design that used 
bundles of 10-pack and 13-pack sports cards.  
Thus, our experiments allow us to draw conclusions regarding: a) whether we observe 
inconsistent preference orderings when we move out of the unfamiliar market of sports cards 
into the more familiar food market b) whether or not evaluative predictions (inferred 
valuations) are better able to generate consistent preference orderings c) the effect of saliency 
of the inferiority of one of the goods on preference reversals between joint and isolated 
evaluation modes and d) the success of the IV method in mitigating social desirability bias. 
The latter is in essence a re-examination of Lusk and Norwood’s (2009a;2009b) conclusions 
with different products, samples and in a different cultural context (given our sample of 
European consumers).  We find, unexpectedly, that the IV method generates higher 
valuations than the CV method in both field experiments. Thus, we designed a 
complementary internet experiment to check whether the cheap talk script (CT) that we used 
in the CV method was responsible for generating valuations much lower than the IV method. 
We found that the pattern of higher inferred valuations than CV is consistent and independent 
of whether we use or not a cheap talk script. 
 
II. Experimental design 
The field experiments we designed are extensions of List’s (2002) and Alevy et al. 
(2011) experiments. Therefore, several of the procedures for studying the implications of 
preference reversals across joint and separate valuation modes were similar to these studies. 
However, we alters List’s (2002) and Alevy et al.’s (2011) studies by replacing the sport 
cards market (which trades commodities unfamiliar to the majority of consumers; especially 
true for non-US residents consumers) with a common and familiar market for most 
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consumers i.e., the food market. The joint and separate modes are evaluated across two 
elicitations methods namely the Contingent and Inferred valuation methods. More than one 
product is used for each valuation method to check for the robustness of our results.  
Data were collected in supermarkets from consumers while shopping. For half of the 
respondents valuations were elicited with the CV method and for the other half with the IV 
method. All valuation products were exhibited in photo stimuli (see Appendix B). Subjects 
were asked to report their willingness to pay for the good in the photo which was also 
described orally. In Field Experiment (FE) 1, the superior quality products were selected to 
be an “organic” (BIO) and a “protected designation of origin” (PDO) product. The inferior 
quality products were the conventional counterparts.  
In FE 2, we made the inferiority of the low quality products more salient by selecting 
products that we presumed would be even less desirable as compared to conventional 
products. For this reason we selected a seed-oil as the lower quality counterpart of the 
organic olive oil. Moreover, in order to more closely mimic List’s “sell-by-items” products 
(remember that 10-pack and 13-pack card bundles were offered in List (2002) and Alevy et 
al. (2011)), we used eggs as our second valuation product. Eggs can be sold in packs of 4, 6, 
8 and 12 eggs in super-markets or in customized packs in open-air food markets. 
 
Field Experiment 1: Design issues 
FE 1 was carried out in super markets located in city AAA (removed for peer review; 
to be adjusted upon publication). The experimenter approached each participant and invited 
him/her to participate voluntarily in an interview. If the respondent accepted the invitation, 
then s/he  was randomly allocated to one of the three evaluation modes (“less”, “more” or 
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“joint”) following the methodology of List (2002) and to one of the two elicitation methods 
(Contingent or Inferred valuation). This design results in six treatments exhibited in Table 1. 
Each subject was only exposed to one of the treatments. 
In each treatment, subjects were asked to evaluate two product categories (olive oil 
and apples) in randomized order. The specific products used are exhibited in Table 2. In the 
“more” evaluation mode the inferior and superior quality products were tied together and 
presented as a single product. In the “Joint” evaluation mode subjects evaluated two products 
per product category side by side (the “less” and the “more” products) for a total of four 
products. Standard socio-demographic data were also collected. Appendix B exhibits photo 
stimuli of the products shown to subjects.  
In all, it took twelve subjects to complete the full factorial design one time. An 
example is given in Table 3. As exhibited, twelve subjects are required to participate in six 
treatments for two quality products (BIO and PDO). 
To sum up, in the “Less” treatments (LI for Less-Isolated) subjects report their 
valuation for a quality food product. In the “More” treatments (MI for More-Isolated) 
subjects report their valuation for a quality food product tied with a smaller quantity of a 
conventional product (see Table 2). In the “Joint” treatments subjects report their valuation 
for both the quality food product (LJ for Less-Joint) as well as the quality product tied 
together with a conventional product (MJ for More-Joint). This design was ran for two 
quality products (BIO and PDO) and two elicitation methods (CV and IV). 
We should note that while the additional conventional food product is of lower 
quality than the PDO or BIO counterparts, in aggregate, the superior food quality product 
tied with the lower quality product have a greater market value than the superior food quality 
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product itself. In the “Joint” treatment, subjects evaluate the exact same products as in 
treatments LI and MI but this time side by side. 
We emphasize that no subject participated in more than one treatments, which means 
that each subject was exposed to either one of the valuation modes (i.e., Less, More or Joint). 
In addition, subjects evaluated the products using either CV or IV methods; that is, no subject 
reported valuations with both methods. Third, each subject reported his/her valuation for one 
quality product, either a PDO product or a BIO product but not both. However, each subject 
reported valuations for two product categories i.e., olive oil and apples. Lastly, order of 
appearance of valuation questions (and products) was completely randomized. 
 
Field Experiment 1: The Survey 
A hypothetical market was established and WTP was elicited in an actual market 
place just before subjects enter a super-market. Interviews took place at various locations 
throughout the city, at stores of the three of the biggest food retailers in the country. The 
interviews were conducted by a single proctor (one of the authors) from Monday to Saturday, 
during morning and afternoon hours. In total, 588 completed questionnaires were collected. 
Table 4a depicts socio-demographic information from this sample. 
WTP was elicited using a payment card format in which subjects selected their most 
preferred choice among a series of sixteen price intervals. More specifically we designed two 
payment cards, one for each product i.e., olive oil and apples (see Appendix C). The payment 
card intervals were constructed using an exponential response scale (Rowe et al. 1996).  
As Rowe, Schulze and Breffle (1996) discuss, psychologists experimenting with the 
brightness of a source of light define the difference between two sources of light as ‘just 
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noticeable’ if the difference can be detected 75% of the time by a subject. If one has a 
sequence of sources arranged in order of increasing brightness, B1, B2, B3, . . . Bn, so that each 
source is just noticeably brighter than the preceding one, the relationship between the sources 
is given by Weber’s law: 
1 1n n nB B k B       (1) 
and the sequence of sources can be described by: 
  11 1  nn kBB     (2) 
Weber’s law has been found to apply broadly when individuals are asked to discriminate 
between stimuli or in our case between “just noticeable” differences of values. The payment 
card intervals can be calculated by selecting the number of cells n and Bn. Drichoutis et al. 
(2009) describe this procedure in detail. The prices were selected so as to cover a wide range 
of market prices for conventional and BIO/PDO olive oil and apples, respectively. 
  
Field Experiment 2: Design issues 
In FE 2 we followed the same experimental design of FE 1 (see Table 1) with some 
modifications for the valuation products. First, in order to make the “inferiority” of the lower 
quality product more salient, we tied the organic olive oil with a seed oil (instead of a 
conventional oil). Seed oils are widely considered inferior quality products in the country as 
compared to olive oil.  
In addition, since the products used up to now are sold by their weight, we introduced 
eggs (instead of apples) as the second valuation product. Eggs are sold by number of items. 
This allows us to more closely mimic List’s (2002) and Alevy et al.’s (2011) itemized-
products (10-pack and 13-pack card bundles).  
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Therefore, in each treatment subjects were asked to evaluate two product categories 
(olive oil and eggs) in randomized order. The specific products used are exhibited in Table 5. 
As in FE 1, in the “More” evaluation mode the inferior and superior quality products were 
tied together and presented as a single product. In the “Joint” evaluation mode subjects 
evaluated two products per product category side by side (the “less” and “more” products) 
for a total of four products. Appendix B exhibits photo stimuli of the products shown to 
subjects. 
In all, it took six subjects to complete the full factorial design one time. An example 
is given in Table 6. As exhibited, six subjects are required to participate in six treatments for 
the organic quality product. 
To sum up, in the “Less” treatments (LI) subjects report their valuation for an organic 
food product. In the “More” treatments (MI) subjects report their valuation for an organic 
food product tied with a smaller quantity (less items) of seed oil (conventional eggs) (see 
Table 5). In the “Joint” treatments subjects report their valuation for both the quality food 
product (LJ) as well as the quality product tied together with an inferior product (MJ). This 
design is repeated for two elicitation methods (CV and IV). 
We should note that while the additional inferior food products are of lower quality 
than the BIO counterparts, in aggregate, the superior food quality product tied with the lower 
quality product have a greater market value than the superior food quality product itself. In 
the “Joint” treatment, subjects evaluate the exact same products as in treatments LI and MI 
but this time side by side. 
No subject participated in more than one treatments, which means that each subject 
was exposed to either one of the valuation modes (i.e., Less, More or Joint). In addition, 
subjects evaluated the products using either CV or IV methods; that is, no subject reported 
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valuations with both methods. Third, each subject reported valuations for two product 
categories i.e., olive oil and eggs. Lastly, order of appearance of valuation questions (and 
products) was completely randomized. 
 
Field Experiment 2: The Survey 
WTP was elicited in an actual market place just before subjects enter a super-market. 
Interviews were conducted by the same proctor as in FE 1. In total, 192 completed 
questionnaires were collected. Table 4a depicts socio-demographic information from this  
sample. 
WTP was elicited using a similar payment card format to FE 1 (see Appendix C); 
payment card intervals were constructed using an exponential response scale. For olive oil 
the payment card was the same as in FE 1. The prices were selected so as to cover a wide 
range of market prices for conventional and organic olive oil, and eggs, respectively. 
 
III. Hypotheses and Results 
To test our hypothesis for “more is less” reversals we adopt the definitions from Alevy et 
al.  (2011). 
Definition 1: A strong evaluation mode effect is observed when, in aggregate, preferences 
over the goods are: LI (Less, Isolated)MI (More, Isolated) and MJ (More, Joint)LJ (Less, 
Joint). 
Definition 2: A weak evaluation mode effect is observed when, in aggregate, preferences 
over the bundles are: LI ~ MI and MJ LJ. 
 
 
12 
 
To test whether the elicitation method (Contingent or Inferred valuation) mitigates mode 
effects (in case we do observe mode effects) we can test for    CV IVLI MI LI MI   .  That 
is, we test whether the gap between the “Less” and “More” isolated treatments becomes 
smaller in the IV elicitation method. Finally, to test the effect of Inferred valuation on elicited 
valuations we can directly test whether Inferred Contingent . 
Table 7 summarizes the test forms that we adopt to test each one of our hypothesis. We 
can directly test these hypotheses by estimating an interval regression model with robust 
clustered standard errors (to account for multiple responses by the same person in the Joint 
treatments). The empirical specification for FE 1 follows closely Alevy et al.’s (2011) 
specification:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10
11 12 13
          
         
i i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i
WTP a a More a Joint a Infer a BIO a More Infer a Joint Infer
a More Joint a More BIO a Joint BIO a BIO Infer
a BIO More Joint a BIO Infer More a BIO In
        
       
       
14 15         
i i
i i i i i i i i
fer Joint
a Infer More Joint a Infer More Joint BIO u

        b'DEM
   (3) 
The DEM vector is a vector of demographic variables described in Table 4a. The More, 
Joint, Infer and BIO variables are dummies indicating conditions consistent with the variable 
name i.e., evaluation of the “More” product, evaluation in the “Joint” mode, evaluation using 
the inferred elicitation method and evaluation of the organic product respectively. A similar 
specification was adopted for FE 2 without the BIO dummy and its interactions (only organic 
products were evaluated in FE 2). 
To test our hypothesis, we use specification (3) to derive linear combinations of 
coefficients for hypothesis testing. These are exhibited in Table 7. Detailed derivations are 
shown in Appendix D. Results from estimating equation (3) are shown in Appendix A. 
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Does CV and IV generate consistent preference orderings? 
To answer this question we test the “more is less” hypothesis as described in Table 7. 
Notice that this test requires checking two hypotheses; a confirmation of inconsistent 
preference orderings requires that MI LI  and MJ LJ , in aggregate. Table 8a shows the 
results of these tests from Field Experiment 1. For each product (olive oil and apples), 
product category (organic, PDO) and method (contingent and inferred valuation) we first test 
whether the respective linear combination of coefficients from Table 7 is 0  
( 0 :  . 0H Linear Comb  ). The alternative hypothesis ( 1 :  . 0H Linear Comb  ) is consistent 
with MI LI . We then test whether the respective linear combination of coefficients is 0  
( 0 :  . 0H Linear Comb  ). The alternative hypothesis ( 1 :  . 0H Linear Comb  ) is consistent 
with MJ LJ . Note that any p-value exhibited in the table implies  1 pvalue  for the 
alternative hypothesis. 
First notice that all linear combinations of coefficients are evaluated as positive which 
implies that MI LI  and MJ LJ . More specifically, all hypothesis involving 
0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   cannot be rejected which suggests that average WTP in the MI mode 
is statistically significantly higher than average WTP in the LI mode2. On the other hand, 
0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   is highly rejected in all cases implying that average WTP in the MJ 
mode is statistically significantly higher than average WTP in the LJ mode. 
Therefore, our Field Experiment 1 shows no evidence of preference reversals of the 
“more is less” type. Data from Field Experiment 2 can help test the robustness of this result. 
                                                 
2 Note that a high pvalue for 0 :  . 0H Linear Comb  , implies a low pvalue for 1 :  . 0H Linear Comb  . Therefore, a 
pvalue 90%  or 95%  for H0 would be equivalent to a rejection for H1 at the 10% or 5% level respectively. 
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In FE 2 we made two significant changes: (a) the inferiority of the lower quality product was 
made more salient for olive oil by using seed oil instead of conventional olive oil and (b) 
eggs were used instead of apples to test whether the sell-by-items nature of the product 
(similar to List’s (2002) and Alevy et al.’s (2011) itemized card bundles) would make a 
difference. 
Results are exhibited in Table 8b. The pattern is similar to FE 1. However, p-values 
for 0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   are, in most cases, much lower than FE 1 and further away from 
conventional significance levels. In essence, p-values lower than 90% (a p-value of 90% is 
equivalent to a 10% significance level) are equivalent to not rejecting 0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   
which implies that average WTP in the MI mode is not statistically different than WTP in the 
LI mode. This in turn implies that LI ~ MI. On the other hand, the hypothesis 
0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   is rejected in all cases implying that MJ LJ . Therefore, in FE 2 we 
observe weak evaluation mode effects. Note that we do  not observe weak evaluation mode 
effects for eggs in the CV method; we rather observe a similar pattern to FE 1. Therefore the 
IV method seems to be more susceptible to weak mode effects than the CV method.  
 
Does IV mitigate mode effects? 
Since we didn’t observe mode effects in FE 1 we can only test whether IV mitigates 
mode effects in FE 2. The test form can only be applied for olive oil since we observe no 
mode effects for eggs under CV but observe weak mode effects for eggs under IV. Therefore 
the answer is obvious for eggs: IV is more susceptible to weak mode effects while with the 
CV method we do not observe preference reversals of the “more is less” kind. 
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Table 7 shows the test form we adopt for this hypothesis testing, as well as the 
respective linear combination of coefficients. Table 9 exhibits results from this test (only for 
FE 2 and olive oil). Notice, that the estimated linear combination of coefficients is positive, 
which indicates that    CV IVLI MI LI MI    i.e., a larger gap between the “Less” and 
“More” modes in CV rather than IV. However, the relative medium sized p-values are 
equivalent to not being able to reject     0CV IVLI MI LI MI    . Given that we found that 
in FE 2 there are weak mode effects for olive oil, our results suggest that Inferred valuation is 
not able to mitigate these effects since    CV IVLI MI LI MI   .  
 
Does IV generate lower valuations than CV? 
The aim of the inferred valuation method, as originally used, was to mitigate social 
desirability bias that is encompassed in hypothetical bias. Lusk and Norwood (2009a;2009b) 
found that IV generated lower valuations than hypothetical valuations and was more close to 
real valuations. Therefore, we would expect average WTP from IV to be lower than average 
WTP from CV: Inferred Contingent . Table 7 indicates linear combinations of coefficients 
that are required to test our hypothesis, by treatment and product. 
Table 10 exhibits results when testing the respective hypothesis appearing in Table 7. 
First notice that all linear combinations of coefficient estimates are positive indicating 
Inferred Contingent . Significance tests are uniform across products, treatments and 
experiments: Inferred valuation generates statistically significant higher valuations than 
Contingent valuation. There are some minor exceptions for FE 1 where the conclusion is that 
IV does not generate statistically significant different estimates, in aggregate, than CV (MJ 
and LJ treatments for PDO apples; LJ treatment for organic olive oil; MI treatments for 
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organic apples and olive oil respectively). Results for FE 2 provide even stronger support. In 
all, there is no single case where we can claim that Inferred valuation mitigates hypothetical 
or social desirability bias, given that Contingent valuation estimates are, in aggregate, always 
lower than estimates obtained from IV. 
This result was unexpected and prompts the need for further investigation. Since we 
used a cheap talk script for elicited valuations with the CV method, it may have been that the 
CT script was more effective in moderating hypothetical bias than what IV has been in 
moderating both social desirability and hypothetical bias. The next section describes an 
internet experiment that was carried out to tackle this issue. 
 
Is the CV method with a  Cheap Talk script more effective than IV? 
We utilized the power of the internet to quickly collect and analyze data for our study. 
Our purpose was not to generalize the elicited valuations to the population but rather to 
randomly expose groups of people to experimental treatments. Thus, we believe that results 
from comparisons of experimental treatments from this sample should hold in general. We do 
not claim that the elicited valuations represent the average consumer but we are not interested 
to the absolute valuations but rather to relative valuations between experimental treatments. 
The internet experiment was administered with SurveyMonkey 
(http://www.surveymonkey.com/). A copy of the questionnaire is available at the anonymous 
website https://sites.google.com/site/morelesscviv/ .  The experimental design involved 
valuation elicitation of Product 1 in FE 1 (organic olive oil) in three treatments: a CV 
question utilizing a Cheap Talk script, a CV question without utilizing a Cheap Talk script 
and an IV question. Each subject was randomly exposed to one of the treatments. The cheap 
talk script was similar to the ones we used in FE 1 and FE 2 and is exhibited in Appendix E.  
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The web link to fill in the survey was advertised in three popular news blogs in the 
country. In total, 634 subjects responded to the advertise with 539 of them filling in the 
questionnaire. Table 4b exhibits demographic characteristics of the internet sample. 
SurveyMonkey provides a safety mechanism to prevent subjects from responding more than 
one time in the questionnaire. The exact same payment card was used as in FE 1 and FE 2. 
To test our hypothesis we adopt an empirical specification of the form:  
             0 1 2i i i iWTP a a CVCT a CVNCT u    b'DEM   (4)                                                                  
The DEM vector is a vector of demographic variables described in Table 4b. The CVCT and 
CVNCT variables are dummies indicating whether the subject was exposed to the CV 
elicitation treatment with cheap talk and without cheap talk respectively. The IV is the 
omitted dummy and serves as the base category. Coefficient estimates are exhibited in table 
A3 in Appendix A. It is obvious that both CV methods (with and without cheap talk) 
generate lower valuations than IV. More precisely, the cheap talk script generates lower 
valuations than IV by 64 cents while the absence of the cheap talk script generates lower 
valuations than IV by 55 cents. Thus, the order of the estimates shows that: CV with CT < CV 
without CT < IV . 
This complementary internet experiment allows us to more safely conclude that the fact 
that we observe that IV generates higher valuations than CV does not depend on the use of a 
cheap talk script. On the contrary, we demonstrated that in more than one experiments the 
CV method (with and without a CT script) generates lower valuations than IV. Thus one of 
the advantages of the IV method in mitigating social desirability bias is questionable, at least 
in the context of this study. 
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IV. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
We started this article with a series of question which we are now ready to answer. List’s 
(2002) paper has been seminal in using data from the sports cards market to explore the 
preference reversal phenomenon. Our study showed that inconsistent preference orderings 
are harder to observe in the more familiar for consumers food market. In our first Field 
Experiment we found no evidence of preference reversals of the “more is less” kind. At best 
we observed some weak mode effects in Field Experiment 2 when we made the inferiority of 
the lower quality product more salient but not when we used a “sell-by-items” product that 
mimics List’s itemized products in the sports card market. This may be an indication that 
preference reversals of a “more is less” kind in the food market are only present under very 
special conditions.  
In one sense, our results are consistent with Alevy et al.’s (2011) results that find that 
market experience alleviates mode effects. The food market can be considered a market in 
which consumers are more experienced (as compared to the sports cards market) and we 
would therefore expect the “more is less” phenomenon to be less prevalent. However, other 
studies have observed inconsistent preference orderings in the food market (Boothe et al. 
2007). 
Since we did observe some weak mode effects in Field Experiment 2, our second 
purpose was to scrutinize the ability of the Inferred valuation method in mitigating mode 
effects. However, we found no evidence in favor of IV. The gap in valuations from different 
modes (“More” or “Less”) was not statistically significantly different between CV and IV. 
Therefore, we cannot advocate in favor of IV for generating consistent preference orderings. 
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On the contrary, in one case while we observe consistent preference orderings when using 
the CV method, we observe weak evaluation mode effects when using the IV method. 
Our last aim was to reexamine the effectiveness of the IV method in mitigating social 
desirability bias. In contrast to the results reported in Lusk and Norwood (2009a;2009b),our 
results show that Inferred valuation consistently generated higher valuations than Contingent 
valuation. To the extent that hypothetical bias and social desirability bias was present in our 
study (and we have no reason to believe that our study would differ from other hypothetical 
studies) this is a sign that IV failed to mitigate social desirability bias. Moreover, our internet 
experiment showed that this pattern of responses is robust even when not using a cheap talk 
script. Thus, we  can safely rule out the case that the cheap talk script mitigated hypothetical 
bias more effectively than what IV mitigated social desirability bias and hypothetical bias. 
Even when we did nothing to mitigate social desirability bias (eliciting valuations without 
using a cheap talk script), IV valuations were statistically significantly higher than CV 
valuations. 
Given that our study was conducted with a sample from a different cultural context 
than Lusk and Norwood’s (2009a;2009b) US based studies, more studies from international 
samples are indeed warranted. It will take time and more studies of this kind to answer the 
question whether the inferred valuation method remains a promising method for mitigating 
biases in other contexts than the ones explored in the original studies. All in all, we believe 
that this topic could indeed be a prime area for future economic research. 
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Table 1. Field experiments - experimental design 
  Elicitation method 
  Contingent valuation 
Inferred 
valuation 
Evaluation 
mode 
Less Less-CV Less-IV 
More More-CV More-IV 
Joint Joint-CV Joint-IV 
 
 
Table 2. Products by evaluation mode (FE 1) 
  Evaluation modes 
  Less More Joint 
Olive oil 
Product 1 BIO olive oil (750 ml)  
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
Product 2  
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Conventional olive oil 
(250 ml) 
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Conventional olive oil 
(250 ml) 
Product 3 PDO olive oil (750 ml)  
PDO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
Product 4  
PDO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Conventional olive oil 
(250 ml) 
PDO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Conventional olive oil 
(250 ml) 
Apples 
Product 5 BIO apples (1 Kgr)  
BIO apples 
(1 Kgr) 
Product 6  
BIO apples 
(1 Kgr) 
+ 
Conventional apples 
(250 gr) 
BIO apples 
(1 Kgr) 
+ 
Conventional apples 
(250 gr) 
Product 7 PDO apples (1 Kgr)  
PDO apples 
(1 Kgr) 
Product 8  
PDO apples 
(1 Kgr ) 
+ 
Conventional apples 
(250 gr) 
PDO apples 
(1 Kgr) 
+ 
Conventional apples 
(250 gr) 
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Table 3. The full factorial design (FE 1) 
Subject 
Products evaluateda 
(refer to Table 2) 
The higher 
quality product 
is... 
Elicitation 
valuation method 
Valuation 
mode 
1 1 and 5 
Organic (BIO) 
Contingent Less 
2 1 and 5 Inferred Less 
3 2 and 6 Contingent More 
4 2 and 6 Inferred More 
5 
1 and 2 side by side 
5 and 6 side by side 
Contingent Joint 
6 
1 and 2 side by side 
5 and 6 side by side 
Inferred Joint 
7 3 and 7 
Protected 
Designation of 
Origin (PDO) 
Contingent Less 
8 3 and 7 Inferred Less 
9 4 and 8 Contingent More 
10 4 and 8 Inferred More 
11 
3 and 4 side by side 
7 and 8 side by side 
Contingent Joint 
12 
3 and 4 side by side 
7 and 8 side by side 
Inferred Joint 
a Product evaluation order was completely randomized 
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Table 4a. Variable description (Field experiments) 
Variables Variable description 
Field 
experiment 
1 
Field 
experiment 
2 
Mean 
(Std.Dev.) 
Mean 
(Std.Dev.) 
Ιncome1 * Dummy, Household’s economic position is bad or very bad=1 
0.049 
(0.217) 
0.047 
(0.212) 
Ιncome2 Dummy, Household’s economic position is below average=1 
0.066 
(0.249) 
0.073 
(0.261) 
Ιncome3 Dummy, Household’s economic position is average=1 
0.505 
(0.500) 
0.531 
(0.500) 
Ιncome4 Dummy, Household’s economic position is above average=1 
0.197 
(0.398) 
0.187 
(0.391) 
Ιncome5 Dummy, Household’s economic position is good=1 
0.143 
(0.350) 
0.130 
(0.337) 
Ιncome6 Dummy, Household’s economic position is very good=1 
0.039 
(0.194) 
0.031 
(0.174) 
Educ1 * 
Dummy, Education level is up to High 
school=1 
0.059 
(0.237) 
0.062 
(0.243) 
Educ2 
Dummy, Education level is High school 
graduate=1 
0.354 
(0.479) 
0.380 
(0.487) 
Educ3 
Dummy, Education level is University 
graduate=1 
0.471 
(0.499) 
0.474 
(0.500) 
Educ4 Dummy, Education level is Postgraduate=1 
0.115 
(0.320) 
0.083 
(0.277) 
Age Subject’s age 45.094 (12.440) 
44.328 
(12.750) 
Child Dummy, Subject has underage children in household=1 
0.415 
(0.493) 
0.271 
(0.445) 
HSize Household size 2.901 (1.381) 
3.094 
(1.270) 
Gender Dummy, Male=1 0.349 (0.477) 
0.266 
(0.443) 
* Variables with an asterisk were omitted from the econometric models  
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Table 4b. Variable description (Internet experiment) 
 
Variables Variable description Mean  (Std.Dev.) 
Ιncome1 * Dummy, Household’s economic position is below average or  bad or very bad=1 
0.093 
(0.290) 
Ιncome2 Dummy, Household’s economic position is average=1 
0.482 
(0.500) 
Ιncome3 Dummy, Household’s economic position is better than average=1 
0.202 
(0.402) 
Ιncome4 Dummy, Household’s economic position is good or very good=1 
0.223 
(0.416) 
Educ1 * 
Dummy, Education level is up to High school 
graduate=1 
0.067 
(0.250) 
Educ2 
Dummy, Education level is some college or 
student=1 
0.135 
(0.342) 
Educ3 
Dummy, Education level is University 
graduate=1 
0.386 
(0.487) 
Educ4 
Dummy, Education level is Postgraduate 
studies=1 
0.412 
(0.493) 
Age1* 
Dummy, Subject’s age is 18 to 25 years 
old=1 
0.124 
(0.330) 
Age2 
Dummy, Subject’s age is 26 to 35 years 
old=1  
0.506 
(0.500) 
Age3 
Dummy, Subject’s age is 36 to 45 years 
old=1  
0.256 
0.437) 
Age4 Dummy, Subject’s age is ≥46 years old=1  0.113 (0.317) 
Child Dummy, Subject has underage children in household=1 
0.286 
(0.452) 
HSize Household size 3.017 (1.382) 
Gender Dummy, Male=1 0.440 (0.497) 
* Variables with an asterisk were omitted from the econometric models  
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Table 5. Products by evaluation mode (FE 2) 
  Evaluation modes 
  Less More Joint 
Olive oil 
Product 1 BIO olive oil 
(750 ml)  
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
Product 2  
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Seed oil 
(250 ml) 
BIO olive oil 
(750 ml) 
+ 
Seed oil 
(250 ml) 
Eggs 
Product 3 BIO eggs 
(8 eggs)  
BIO eggs 
(8 items) 
Product 4  
BIO eggs 
(8 eggs) 
+ 
Conventional eggs 
(3 eggs) 
BIO eggs 
(8 eggs) 
+ 
Conventional eggs 
(3 eggs) 
 
Table 6. The full factorial design (FE 2) 
Subject 
Products evaluateda 
(refer to Table 5) 
The higher 
quality product 
is... 
Elicitation 
valuation method 
Valuation 
mode 
1 1 and 3 
Organic (BIO) 
Contingent Less 
2 1 and 3 Inferred Less 
3 2 and 4 Contingent More 
4 2 and 4 Inferred More 
5 
1 and 2 side by side 
3 and 4 side by side 
Contingent Joint 
6 
1 and 2 side by side 
3 and 4 side by side 
Inferred Joint 
a Product evaluation order was completely randomized 
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Table 7. Linear combinations of coefficients for hypothesis testing 
Hypothesis 
Tested Test form 
Field 
experim
ent 
Elicitation 
method or 
valuation 
mode 
Organica PDOa 
“More is 
less” 
MI LI  
and 
MJ LJ  
1 
Contingent
0More More BIO    & 
0
More More Joint More BIO
BIO More Joint
   
     
0More   & 
0More More Joint    
Inferred 
0
More More Infer More BIO
BIO Infer More
   
     & 
0
More More Infer More Joint More BIO
BIO More Joint BIO Infer More
Infer More Joint Infer More Joint BIO
     
     
       
0More More Infer    & 
0
More More Infer More Joint
Infer More Joint
   
   
 
2 
Contingent 0More   & 0More More Joint     
Inferred 
0More More Infer     & 
0
More More Infer More Joint
Infer More Joint
   
     
 
Does IV 
mitigate 
mode 
effects? 
   CV IVLI MI LI MI  
 
1  0More Infer BIO Infer More      0More Infer   
2  0More Infer    
Does IV 
generate 
lower 
valuations 
than CV? 
Inferred Contingent  1 
MJ 
treatment 
0
Infer More Infer Joint Infer BIO Infer
BIO Infer More BIO Infer Joint
Infer More Joint Infer More Joint BIO
     
     
       
0
Infer More Infer Joint Infer
Infer More Joint
   
   
 
LJ 
treatment 0
Infer Joint Infer BIO Infer
BIO Infer Joint
   
     0Infer Joint Infer    
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MI 
treatment 0
Infer More Infer BIO Infer
BIO Infer More
   
     0Infer More Infer    
LI 
treatment 
0Infer BIO Infer    0Infer   
2 
MJ 
treatment 0
Infer More Infer Joint Infer
Infer More Joint
   
      
LJ 
treatment 
0Infer Joint Infer     
MI 
treatment 
0Infer More Infer     
LI 
treatment 
0Infer    
a The expressions involved in these columns concern coefficients which are named of their respective dummies. 
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Table 8a. Hypothesis for “more is less” in Field Experiment 1 
 
  Olive oil Apples 
Organic PDO Organic PDO 
Linear combination (p-value) 
Contingent 
0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   
1.337 
(0.987) 
1.452 
(0.997) 
0.393 
(0.980) 
0.477 
(0.998) 
0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   
0.878 
(0.00) 
0.970 
(0.00) 
0.278 
(0.00) 
0.388 
(0.00) 
Inferred 
0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   
1.268 
(0.996) 
1.316 
(0.994) 
0.279 
(0.933) 
0.639 
(1.00) 
0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   
1.446 
(0.00) 
1.444 
(0.00) 
0.398 
(0.00) 
0.463 
(0.00) 
 
Table 8b. Hypothesis for “more is less” in Field Experiment 2 
  Olive oil Eggs 
Organic Organic 
Linear combination 
estimates (p-value) 
Contingent 
0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   
0.452 
(0.684) 
0.891 
(0.961) 
0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   
0.570 
(0.00) 
0.329 
(0.00) 
Inferred 
0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   
0.968 
(0.899) 
0.037 
(0.531) 
0 :  . 0H Linear Comb   
1.084 
(0.00) 
0.742 
(0.00) 
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Table 9. Hypothesis testing whether IV mitigates mode effects 
Field 
experiment 
2 
0 : 0H Linear Comb.  
Organic Olive oil 
Linear combination 
estimates (p-value) 
0.516 
(0.337) 
 
Table 10. Hypothesis testing whether IV generates lower valuations than CVa 
a The hypothesis tested is 0 :  . 0H Linear Comb  . Table 7 requires that the Linear Combination of 
coefficients is 0 . 
Field 
experiment 1 
  Olive oil Apples 
Organic PDO Organic PDO 
Linear combination estimates (p-values) 
Joint 
More 
1.104 
(0.963) 
1.874 
(0.998) 
0.460 
(0.979) 
-0.013 
(0.473) 
Less 
0.536 
(0.838) 
1.400 
(0.994) 
0.341 
(0.956) 
-0.088 
(0.297) 
Isolated 
More 
0.664 
(0.875) 
1.398 
(0.997) 
0.217 
(0.861) 
0.392 
(0.986) 
Less 
0.734 
(0.928) 
1.535 
(0.998) 
0.331 
(0.970) 
0.230 
(0.922) 
Field 
experiment 2 
  Olive oil Eggs 
  Organic 
Joint 
More 
3.885 
(1.00) 
- 
1.055 
(0.976) 
- 
Less 
3.371 
(1.00) 
- 
0.641 
(0.898) 
- 
Isolated 
More 
2.062 
(0.984) 
- 
0.245 
(0.686) 
- 
Less 
1.545 
(0.981) 
- 
1.099 
(0.986) 
- 
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Appendix A: Interval regression coefficient estimates 
 
Table A1. Coefficient estimates (Field Experiment 1) 
 Olive oil Apples 
 Coefficient (Standard 
error) 
Coefficient (Standard 
error) 
Constant 4.164*** (0.942) 1.330*** (0.363) 
More 1.452*** (0.527) 0.477*** (0.163) 
Joint -0.306 (0.616) 0.273 (0.179) 
Infer 1.535*** (0.547) 0.230 (0.162) 
BIO 1.307** (0.562) 0.486*** (0.173) 
MoreInfer -0.137 (0.748) 0.162 (0.244) 
JointInfer -0.135 (0.781) -0.318 (0.236) 
MoreJoint -0.483 (0.546) -0.090 (0.171) 
MoreBIO  -0.115 (0.805) -0.084 (0.249) 
JointBIO -0.219 (0.849) -0.492* (0.278) 
BIOInfer -0.801 (0.738) 0.101 (0.237) 
BIOMoreJoint 0.024 (0.823) -0.026 (0.258) 
BIOInferMore 0.067 (1.069) -0.276 (0.356) 
BIOInferJoint -0.062 (1.067) 0.327 (0.353) 
InferMoreJoint 0.611 (0.772) -0.087 (0.253) 
InferMoreJointBIO 0.026 (1.106) 0.321 (0.370) 
Ιncome2 1.146* (0.612) 0.438 (0.283) 
Ιncome3 1.440*** (0.469) 0.423* (0.234) 
Ιncome4 1.574*** (0.538) 0.468* (0.250) 
Ιncome5 0.734 (0.566) 0.245 (0.260) 
Ιncome6 2.729*** (0.743) 0.757** (0.315) 
Educ2 1.991*** (0.555) 0.452** (0.208) 
Educ3 1.553*** (0.553) 0.478** (0.205) 
Educ4 2.179*** (0.685) 0.629*** (0.231) 
Age -0.042*** (0.011) -0.013*** (0.004) 
Child -0.141 (0.322) 0.147 (0.112) 
HSize -0.188 (0.115) -0.079** (0.040) 
Gender -0.837*** (0.259) -0.036 (0.086) 
Ν 784 
Log pseudolikelihood -2061.843 -2096.666 
*** (**) [*] notes significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] percent level. 
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Table A2. Coefficient estimates (Field Experiment 2) 
 Olive oil Eggs 
 Coefficient (Standard 
error) 
Coefficient (Standard 
error) 
Constant 7.423*** (2.034) 3.350*** (1.222) 
More 0.452 (0.946) 0.891* (0.506) 
Joint -1.848** (0.898) 0.698 (0.478) 
Infer 1.545** (0.741) 1.099** (0.497) 
MoreInfer 0.516 (1.225) -0.855 (0.709) 
JointInfer 1.826 (1.123) -0.458 (0.708) 
MoreJoint 0.118 (0.961) -0.562 (0.517) 
InferMoreJoint -0.002 (1.250) 1.268* (0.729) 
Ιncome2 -3.302** (1.301) -0.557 (0.717) 
Ιncome3 -1.119 (0.922) -0.109 (0.567) 
Ιncome4 -0.040 (1.098) 0.159 (0.592) 
Ιncome5 -1.085 (1.041) 0.693 (0.663) 
Ιncome6 2.337 (2.198) 2.054 (1.360) 
Educ2 -0.577 (1.247) -1.668** (0.787) 
Educ3 -0.497 (1.239) -1.227 (0.777) 
Educ4 -0.938 (1.416) -1.721* (0.921) 
Age -0.065** (0.025) 0.030** (0.014) 
Child -1.579*** (0.574) 0.163 (0.421) 
HSize 0.639*** (0.226) -0.115 (0.112) 
Gender 0.377 (0.609) -0.270 (0.330) 
Ν 256 
Log pseudolikelihood -673.241 -694.475 
*** (**) [*] notes significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] percent level. 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table A3. Coefficient estimates (Internet experiment) 
 
 Olive oil 
 Coefficient (Standard 
error) 
Constant 5.373*** (0.648) 
CV - Cheap Talk -0.640*** (0.239) 
CV – No Cheap Talk  -0.547** (0.238) 
Age2 -0.449 (0.324) 
Age3 -0.891** (0.389) 
Age4 -1.009** (0.443) 
Income2 0.519 (0.344) 
Income3 0.422 (0.382) 
Income4 0.206 (0.376) 
Education2 0.701 (0.492) 
Education3 0.351 (0.427) 
Education4 0.637 (0.434) 
HSize 0.014 (0.077) 
Child -0.027 (0.258) 
Gender -0.518** (0.203) 
Ν 539 
Log pseudolikelihood -1456.991 
*** (**) [*] notes significant at the 1% (5%) [10%] percent level. 
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Appendix B: Photo stimuli by treatment 
 
Field Experiment 1 – Less, isolated treatment (LI) 
ORGANIC 
Product 1 Product 5 
750 ml 
 
1 Kgr 
 
 
 
PDO 
Product 3 Product 7 
750 ml 
 
1 Kgr 
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Field Experiment 1 – More, isolated treatment (MI) 
ORGANIC 
Product 2 Product 6 
750 ml 
 
tied with 
250 ml 
1 Kgr 
 
 
tied with 
250 gr 
 
 
PDO 
Product 4 Product 8 
750 ml 
 
tied with  
250 ml 
 
1 Kgr 
 
 
tied with 
250 gr 
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Field Experiment 2 – Less, isolated treatment (LI) 
 
Product 1 Product 3 
750 ml 
 
8 items of eggs 
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Field Experiment 2 –More, isolated treatment (MI) 
 
Product 2 Product 4 
750 ml 
 
tied with 
 
250 ml 
 
      
8 items of eggs 
 
 
 
 
tied with 
 
3 items of eggs  
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Appendix C: Payment cards 
 
C1. Olive oil 
 
Payment card (€) 
 
1. 0  9. 4.96       -      5.55 
2. 0.01     -      2.50  10. 5.56       -      6.22 
3. 2.51     -      2.80  11. 6.23       -      6.97 
4. 2.81      -     3.14  12. 6.98       -      7.81 
5. 3.15      -     3.52  13. 7.82       -      8.76 
6. 3.53      -     3.94  14. 8.77       -      9.82 
7. 3.95      -     4.42  15. 9.83     -      11.00 
8. 4.43      -     4.95  16. >11.00 
 
C2. Apples 
 
Payment card (€) 
 
1. 0  9. 2.10    -   2.29 
2. 0.01     -    1.20  10. 2.30    -   2.52 
3. 1.21     -     1.32  11. 2.53    -    2.76 
4. 1.33      -    1.44  12. 2.77    -    3.03 
5. 1.45      -    1.58  13. 3.03   -    3.32 
6. 1.59      -   1.74  14. 3.33   -    3.65 
7. 1.75    -    1.91  15. 3.66   -    4.00 
8. 1.92     -    2.09  16. >4.00 
 
C3. Eggs 
 
Payment card (€) 
 
1. 0  9. 3.77    -   4.22 
2. 0.01     -    1.90  10. 4.23    -   4.73 
3. 1.91     -     2.13  11. 4.74   -    5.30 
4. 2.14      -    2.39  12. 5.31    -    5.94 
5. 2.40      -    2.67  13. 5.95   -    6.66 
6. 2.68      -   3.00  14. 6.67   -    7.46 
7. 3.01    -    3.36  15. 7.47   -    8.36 
8. 3.37     -    3.76  16. >8.36 
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Appendix D: Linear combinations of coefficients for Hypothesis testing 
 
D1. To test for “more is less” reversals for Field Experiment 1 we need: 
 
Contingent Valuation & Organic: 
0
MI LI Constant More BIO More BIO Constant BIO
More More BIO
        
   
b'DEM b'DEM
 
0
MJ LJ Constant More Joint BIO More Joint More BIO
Joint BIO BIO More Joint Constant Joint BIO Joint BIO
More More Joint More BIO BIO More Joint
       
           
        
b'DEM b'DEM

 
 
Contingent Valuation & PDO: 
0MI LI Constant More Constant More      b'DEM b'DEM  
0
MJ LJ Constant More Joint More Joint Constant Joint
More More Joint
        
   
b'DEM b'DEM  
 
Inferred Valuation & Organic: 
0
MI LI Constant More Infer BIO More Infer More BIO BIO Infer
BIO Infer More Constant Infer BIO BIO Infer
More More Infer More BIO BIO Infer More
         
         
        
b'DEM b'DEM

 
MJ LJ Constant More Joint Infer BIO More Infer Joint Infer More Joint
More BIO Joint BIO BIO Infer BIO More Joint BIO Infer More
BIO Infer Joint Infer More Joint Infer More Joint BIO Constant Jo
          
           
            b'DEM

0
int
Infer BIO Joint Infer Joint BIO BIO Infer BIO Infer Joint
More More Infer More Joint More BIO BIO More Joint BIO Infer More
Infer More Joint Infer More Joint BIO
           
            
       
b'DEM
 
Inferred Valuation & PDO: 
0
MI LI Constant More Infer More Infer Constant Infer
More More Infer
        
   
b'DEM b'DEM
 
0
MJ LJ Constant More Joint Infer More Infer Joint Infer More Joint
Infer More Joint Constant Joint Infer Joint Infer
More More Infer More Joint Infer More Joint
         
         
        
b'DEM b'DEM

 
 
To test for “more is less” reversals for Field Experiment 2 we need: 
 
Contingent Valuation: 
0
MI LI Constant More Constant
More
    
 
b'DEM b'DEM
 
0
MJ LJ Constant More Joint More Joint Constant Joint
More More Joint
        
   
b'DEM b'DEM  
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Inferred Valuation: 
0
MI LI Constant More Infer More Infer Constant Infer
More More Infer
        
   
b'DEM b'DEM
 
0
MJ LJ Constant More Joint Infer More Infer Joint Infer More Joint
Infer More Joint Constant Joint Infer Joint Infer
More More Infer More Joint Infer More Joint
         
         
        
b'DEM b'DEM

 
 
D2. To test whether inferred valuation mitigates mode effects we test for Field Experiment 2: 
 
       
   
0
CV IVLI MI LI MI Constant Constant More
Constant Infer Constant More Infer More Infer
More Infer
          
         
  
b'DEM b'DEM
b'DEM b'DEM
 
 
 
D3. To test whether inferred valuation generates lower valuations than contingent valuation 
we need: 
 
For the MJ treatment and Organic in Field Experiment 1: 
Inferred Contingent Constant More Joint Infer BIO More Infer Joint Infer
More Joint More BIO Joint BIO BIO Infer BIO More Joint BIO Infer More
BIO Infer Joint Infer More Joint Infer More Joint BIO
         
             
           b'D
0
Constant
More Joint BIO More Joint More BIO Joint BIO BIO More Joint
Infer More Infer Joint Infer BIO Infer BIO Infer More BIO Infer Joint
Infer More Joint Infer More Joint BIO

            
            
       
EM
b'DEM
 
 
 
For the MJ treatment and PDO in Field Experiment 1: 
0
Inferred Contingent Constant More Joint Infer More Infer Joint Infer
More Joint Infer More Joint Constant More Joint
More Joint
Infer More Infer Joint Infer Infer More Joint
        
        
  
        
b'DEM
b'DEM
 
 
For the LJ treatment and Organic in Field Experiment 1: 
0
Inferred Contingent Constant Joint Infer BIO Joint Infer
Joint BIO BIO Infer BIO Infer Joint Constant Joint
BIO Joint BIO
Infer Joint Infer BIO Infer BIO Infer Joint
      
         
   
        
b'DEM
b'DEM
 
 
For the LJ treatment and PDO in Field Experiment 1: 
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0
Inferred Contingent Constant Joint Infer Joint Infer
Constant Joint
Infer Joint Infer
     
   
   
b'DEM b'DEM
 
 
For the MI treatment and Organic in Field Experiment 1: 
0
Inferred Contingent Constant More Infer BIO More Infer More BIO
BIO Infer BIO Infer More Constant More BIO More BIO
Infer More Infer BIO Infer BIO Infer More
        
           
        
b'DEM b'DEM
 
 
For the MI treatment and PDO in Field Experiment 1: 
0
Inferred Contingent Constant More Infer More Infer
Constant More
Infer More Infer
     
   
   
b'DEM b'DEM
 
 
For the LI treatment and Organic in Field Experiment 1: 
0
Inferred Contingent Constant Infer BIO BIO Infer Constant
BIO
Infer BIO Infer
       
 
   
b'DEM
b'DEM
 
 
For the LI treatment and PDO in Field Experiment 1: 
0
Inferred Contingent Constant Infer Constant
Infer
     
 
b'DEM b'DEM
 
 
For the MJ treatment in Field Experiment 2: 
0
Inferred Contingent Constant More Joint Infer More Infer Joint Infer
More Joint Infer More Joint Constant More Joint
More Joint
Infer More Infer Joint Infer Infer More Joint
        
        
  
        
b'DEM
b'DEM
 
 
For the LJ treatment in Field Experiment 2: 
0
Inferred Contingent Constant Joint Infer Joint Infer
Constant Joint
Infer Joint Infer
     
   
   
b'DEM b'DEM
 
 
For the MI treatment in Field Experiment 2: 
0
Inferred Contingent Constant More Infer More Infer Constant More
Infer More Infer
        

   
b'DEM
b'DEM
 
 
For the LI treatment in Field Experiment 2: 
0
Inferred Contingent Constant Infer Constant
Infer
     
 
b'DEM b'DEM
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Appendix E: Cheap talk script 
 
In the next page you will be asked to indicate how much would you be willing to pay for an 
organic food product. 
 
We'd like you to pay attention to the following: Surveys have shown that usually consumers 
respond differently in a questionnaire and ACT differently in reality. It is very common 
to state a higher willingness to pay than what they are actually willing to pay. 
 
We believe this is due to the fact that it's very easy to overstate willingness to pay, since no 
one has to actually buy the product in question. Please answer the willingness to pay question 
thinking that right now you are in a super market in which you intend to buy a product 
from this category. 
 
We'd like to remind you that by choosing to pay to buy organic food, available income for 
buying other products will be reduced. 
 
Please have these in mind when answering the next questions. 
 
 
